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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
sustain the finding. Negligence and baid faith were contended to be dis-
tinct since in the Wisconsin Zinc Company case the court held that
fraud was evidence of bad faith but that there could be no recovery
for negligence. However, the court in the Hilker case, took the view as
has already been stated in the first paradraph of this comment, that
bad faith and negligence are synonymous and that negligence points
directly to bad faith.
To put the Hilker case succinctly, an assured may recover from his
insurance company in excess of his policy limits if a judgment is ren-
dered against him over the amount of the policy limit as the result of
bad faith on the part of the insurance company which may be shown
by fraud (Wisconsin Zinc Company case), or by negligence in investi-
gating and adjusting and in failing to notify the assured of the danger
of the case against him (the Hilker case).
In the decision of the court on rehearing it said, "Each case pre-
senting the issue of liability of an insurance carrier under such circum-
stances as here presented must be determined upon its own peculiar
state of facts." A little farther down in the decision, the court defines
the antonym of bad faith, namely, good faith, in this way. "But the
good faith performance of the obligation which the insurance com-
pany assumed when it took to itself the complete and exclusive control
of all matters that determine the liability of the insured, require that
it be, held to that degree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary
care and prudence would exercise in the management of his own busi-
ness were he investigating and adjusting such claims." In these words
lies the gist of the decision, making the proof of the negligence suffi-
cient of itself to sustain a finding of bad faith. As the law exists, then,
an insurance company may be liable for bad faith by proof of fraud or
negligence on its part.
CLYDE SHEETS.
INSURANcE-AGENT'S COMMISSION-STATE REGULATION-POLICE
POWER. H. Insurance Company employed O&Y as local fire insurance
agents and agreed to pay reasonable compensation. O&Y demanded
25% of the premiums collected. The Insurance Company paid 20%,
and denied liability for premiums in excess of that percentage. The
Insurance Company asserted a New Jersey Law: "In order that the
rates of insurance against the hazards of fire shall be reasonable it
shall be unlawful for any such insurer licensed in this state to directly
or indirectly pay or allow any commission in excess of that offered,
paid or allowed to any one of its local agents on such risks in this
state." (Chap. 128, Sec. 1, Act of Mar. 28, 1828.) The evidence
showed that all other agents of H. Ins. Co. received 20%. Held: that
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this New Jersey act does not deprive O&Y of property without due
process of law, and that such rate regulation is within the police
power. O'Gorman & Young, Inc., v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (1931)
51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 130, 76 Ins. L. Journal 516.
Applied to existing insurance agency conditions the New Jersey act
reveals serious flaws. Providing equal compensation to all agents rep-
resenting a particular company, it leaves the way open for other com-
panies to have a different standard of compensation, and perchance an
agent may find himself with the several companies in his office each
paying on a different commission basis, leaving no doubt as to which
company will receive the cream and bulk of the agent's business. More
valuable agents, or those with preferred risks, will be held to the lower
rate paid to others for average or less desirable risks. On the other
hand, payment of high commissions to agents may impair the financial
stability of insurers. The percentage of the premium paid to an agent
bears a direct relation to the rate charged. More important is the extent
to which the state can now directly control agents' commissions. Con-
trolling the agent, cannot the state, by dictating the general and special
agents' commissions, contingency bonuses paid to agents for low loss
ratios, adjusting expenses, lobbying expenses, and tax payments, prac-
tically tell the companies what to do and how much to charge? The
trend seems in that direction, and the police power, following the per-
mit of O'Gorman & Young, can menace the insurance companies
alarmingly. The state can strike at the overhead and profits. In all
lines of insurance the overhead is terrific. In State ex rel Time Ins. Co.
V. Smith, 184 Wis. 455, Justice Crownhart, dissenting, said: "Health
and accident insurance costs more than 50% of the premiums for over-
head in this state. It is a poor investment. Such excessive costs can
hardly be justified in the public interest." A recent MARQUETTE LAW
REViEw article states that of the automobile insurance premiums paid
in, two-thirds is diverted to overhead, commissions, and profits. 15
Marq. L. Rev. 19.'It is therefore clear that the O'Gorman & Young
decision, decided by a 5 to 4 division of the court, is important be-
cause it adds to the right of the state to control the rate charged the
policyholder the additional right to adroitly limit the components of
the rate.
The insurance business holds such a peculiar relation to the public
interests that there is superimposed upon it the right of public regula-
tion. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389. This case gives
the state the right to regulate unearned premium funds or reserves,
dividend limits, investments and assets, discrimination in rates, limita-
tions of risk, and other vital factors. Cf. 233 U.S. 412. Wisconsin re-
serves the right to control corporations under its constitution. Stone
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v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181. And the state legislature may "impose any
conditions, reasonable or unreasonable * * *" State er rel Drake v.
Doyle, 40 Wis. 175. Cf. 99 Wis. 371. The state may discriminate be-
tween classes of companies. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co.v. Wisconsin,
247 U.S. 132; State v. U. S. Mut. Acc. Assn., 67 Wis. 624. In Wiscon-
sin, the police power was applied to agency commissions as early as
1862, in Fire Dept v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 137, wherein fire department
dues were held collectible from a local agent as a proper exercise of
the police power. Generally, an insurance company may be charged a
percentage of premiums to maintain a fire department, Trustees v.
Roome, 93 N.Y. 313; and even to maintain a fireman's benevolent as-
sociation, Firemen's Benev. Assn. v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511; Van
Inwagen v. Chicago, 61 Ill. 31. Imposing upon the agent of a foreign
insurance company a license tax of a percentage of the premiums col-
lected at his agency is not unconstitutional,People v. Thurber, 13 Ill.
554; Fire Dept. v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 137. A license fee may be
based on a percentage of the premiums received. New York Life Ins.
Co. v. State, 192 Wis. 404. But to levy on interest received from bonds
and securities of the United States is unconstitutional. Northwestern
Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, (U.S.) 48 Sup. Ct. 55. A state may
impose a personal penalty on an agent, as where business is written in
unlicensed companies and a loss is but partially paid. Cordy v. Northern
Sec. Co., 177 Wis. 68. Machines installed to vend policies on railroads
may be prohibited under the police power pursuant to statutes requir-
ing policies to be issued through local agents resident in the state.
State v. Smith, 184 Wis. 309. The legislature may set up general stand-
ards for the insurance commissioner to follow. State er rel Wis. Ins.
Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472. The insurance commissioner may
control salaries of insurance company officials, so as to require that
salaries be reasonable. State ex rel National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Conn.
115 Ohio St. 607. He may also compel a distribution of dividends to
policyholders. Equitable Life Assur. Co. v. Host, 124 Wis. 657.
In the O'Gorman & Young case, the minority opinion declared that
the public's concern was with rates, and that to interfere with an
agency contract is a trespass on the insurers control of their private
affairs. "Like any other expense item broker's commissions may ulti-
mately affect the rate charged for policies, but this is true of the
wages of office boys, printers, bookkeepers, actuaries, officers; the
price paid for pens, ink, or other supplies,-indeed, whatever expense
may be incurred * * *" For a state to interfere too far is to abridge
freedom of contract. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 51
Sup. Ct. Rep. 130; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1;
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494. The business of an in-
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surance agent is primarily a private enterprise. Hobbins v. Hannan et
al, 186 Wis. 284. To limit the number of agents in a particular locality
is to deprive persons following such occupation of their property
without due process of law. Northwestern Natl. Ins. Co. v. Fishback,
130 Wash. 470. As to dealing with agents, the jurisdiction of the
insurance commissioner is purely statutory. Union Indemnity Co. v.
Smith, 187 Wis. 528 @ 538. The commissioner cannot draw up an in-
surance form, as that function is legislative. Dowling v. Lanchashire
Ins. Co., 92 Wis 63. A legislature cannot authorize a municipality to
levy in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. Broadhead v.
Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624. Where a state law and a city law each levy
a tax of 2% on premiums, the result is double taxation. Fire Dept. v.
Tuttle, 48 Wis. 91. A state cannot make past compliance with an un-
constitutional tax a condition precedent to a renewal of a license, as
where premiums were deemed personalty and taxed at 30% of value.
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494. If -the revenue pur-
pose is more important than the regulative, the imposition is a tax.
San Francisco v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 74 Cal. 113.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. establishes the
proposition that agency commissions may be controlled and limited by
legislative fiat. It will be interesting to observe whether and how legis-
latures extend the police power to other details of the insurance
business.
RONALD A. PADWAY.
JOINT ADVENTURE-Whether a joint adventurer can claim compen-
sation for services rendered in conducting the affairs of the adventure,
in the absence of an express agreement to that effect, is the ultimate
problem presented in Week v. Week's Estate, 235 N.W. 448, (Wis.).
Plaintiff and the deceased defendant entered an oral agreement
in 1902, whereby they agreed to make equal contributions to the
expense and to share equally the profits and losses of developing water
power on the Spokane river. They worked together for seven years
when in 1909 the deceased left Spokane. From 1909 to the time of
actual sale, the plaintiff and defendant were on the look-out for buy-
ers. In 1924, mostly through the efforts of deceased and an attorney
hired by him, the property was sold.
The plaintiff claims that the deceased agreed to compensate him
for the time and service he devoted to the adventure in excess of the
time and service deceased gave to it, and that he is entitled to recover
the deceased's estate $25,000 as a reasonable value of such excess.
Plaintiff claims that since deceased was away from Spokane for
about fifteen years, he (the plaintiff) should be compensated for look-
